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The global crisis brings about renewed reforms on central bank policy. First, in addition to the 
traditional mandate of price stability, there are strong supports for additional mandate of the central bank 
to promote financial system stability. Second, macroprudential policy is needed to address procyclicality 
and build-up systemic risks in the macro-financial linkages of financial system that in most cases precede 
and deepen financial crisis. Third, monetary and financial stability are also prone to volatility of capital 
flows, especially for the emerging countries, and thus there is a need to manage them. The challenge 
is how to mix the policies of monetary, macroprudential, and capital flows management to meet the 
renewed mandate of central bank on monetary and financial stability. This paper reviews theoretical 
underpinnings and provides key concepts to address the issues. We show that central bank policy mix is 
both conceptually coherent and practically implementable. We provide a concrete recommendation with 
a reference from Indonesia’s experience since 2010. We also raise a number of challenges from practical 
point of views, especially relating to decision making process, forecasting model, and communication, 
for the success of the policy mix.
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I. INTRODUCTION
The global crisis unveils a number of flaws in the economy that is based on capital financing 
intermediated through financial system. In the words of Minsky (1982), financial instability is 
inherent within capitalist economy whereby inflation and debt accumulation have the potential 
to spin out of control in the period of economic upswing. Stability is destabilizing, and thus 
leads to ‘boom’ and ‘bust’ in the financial cycles, causing the economy falls into crisis. That 
procyclicality of asset price bubbles and credit booms precedes and causes crises in many 
countries was not new (Claessens and Kose, 2013). Equally, that crisis is fundamentally a 
problem of excessive accumulation of debt, be it by public or private, has been found in long 
history of crises (Reinhart and Rogoff, 2009; Kindleberger, 1978). And that the crises are more 
frequent and metaphors into multifaceted financial crises of currency, debt, and banking in 
many countries are widely evidenced (Bordo, et.al, 2001). 
What the global crisis have the implications on the central bank mandate and policy? First, 
beyond the primacy of price stability, central bank needs to have a key role in financial system 
stability. For one thing, monetary policy impacts stability of financial system through interest 
rate, exchange rate, firm’s decision on investment, bank lending, and investor portfolio decisions. 
Prolonged low interest rate under low inflation environment could elevate financial cycles and 
build-up systemic risks, and thus cause instability in the financial system and economy. The 
US experience clearly show this, whereby Great Moderation leads to housing bubbles, credit 
booms, excessive risk taking, and leverages. The Asian crisis of 1997-1998 shows similar case, 
whereby more than a decade of East Asian Miracle induced macro-financial imbalances that 
were then unveiled from the crisis: credit booms, property bubbles, and excessive private external 
borrowing. For the other thing, the stability of financial system is a key for effective monetary 
policy transmission. The recent experiences of advanced countries since the global crisis, notably 
in the US, Euro area, and Japan, show that the effectiveness of their ultra-quantitative easing 
and near zero interest rates has been constrained by deleveraging and restructuring process 
of their financial systems. The relation between monetary stability and financial stability is thus 
mutual, complimentary, and reinforcing.
Second, procyclicality and systemic risks in macro-financial linkages of the financial system 
could not be addressed by interest rate policy or microprudential measures. Monetary policy 
generally do not take sufficient account of build-up systemic risks from asset price bubbles or 
leverages, and assume that microprudential regulation could control such build up risks, of 
which is not the case (IMF, 2010). Monetary policy could “lean against the wind” to mitigate 
the asset price bubbles, e.g. by increasing interest when there is evidence of accelerated housing 
prices. But housing markets are driven mostly by factors beyond interest rates, particularly by 
buoyant expectation on further price increases and lackluster financing from banks, developers, 
or foreign borrowings. Interest rate increases also impact across the board to all sectors, not only 
to the housing market. Likewise, microprudential may be used to address the housing bubbles, 
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e.g. by increasing its risk weighted measures on capital requirement. But this is where another 
problem lies: risk valuation of capital requirement is by in itself procyclical. Risk valuation tends 
to underestimate the true risks during economic boom and overestimate during recession. 
For these conceptual and fundamental reasons, macroprudential policy gains wide supports 
as instrument to address procyclicality and systemic risks in the financial system, and that the 
central bank is the most appropriate institution to assume this function. 
Third, volatility of capital flows to emerging countries has been excessively high since the 
global crisis. During the period from 2009 to mid-2013, large capital inflows to emerging market 
economies (EMEs) have been unprecedented, driven by huge global excess liquidity from ultra-
quantitative monetary easing and near zero interest rates in the advanced countries searching for 
high returns. But the Fed tapper tantrum in May 2013 has changed their behaviors: excessively 
volatile and prone to risk-on and risk-off investors’ perception responding to short-term news. 
While their invaluable benefits for the economy are widely acknowledged, large capital flows, 
if not managed properly, can expose the EMEs to serious macro-financial imbalances and risks. 
Kawai and Takagi (2008) cited three types of risks emanated from volatile capital flows, i.e.: (i) 
macroeconomic risks of rapid credit growth, current account imbalances, and real exchange 
appreciation, (ii) financial instability risks of maturity and currency mismatches, asset prices 
increases, and decelerating quality of assets, and (iii) sudden stops risks and/or capital reversals 
of capital flows. Again, interest rate response alone would not be effective. While exchange 
rate flexibility is generally accepted response as shock absorber to external shocks, its excessive 
short-term volatility may pose serious risks to both monetary and financial stability. For these 
reasons, central banks in the EMEs adopts various measures of capital flows management to 
support their interest rate and exchange rate policies in achieving price stability and promoting 
financial stability.
The two main purposes of this paper are modest. First, we review growing thinking from 
the policy makers and academicians with a view to draw some common ground on the possibility 
of a policy mix on how central bank respond to these three challenges. Our focus is from the 
perspective of the EMEs. Key concepts will be discussed and outlined, including the mandate 
of central bank in financial stability, role and instruments of macroprudential policy, as well 
as capital flows management. Second, we present Bank Indonesia experience in formulating 
conceptual framework and implementing the policy mix since 2010. The policy framework is 
based on the inflation targeting using interest rate as the main instrument, complemented by 
exchange rate policy, capital flows management, and macroprudential measures. We find the 
policy mix plays an important role for Indonesia resilience in withstanding the bouts of uncertainty 
and volatility from the global economy and financial markets since the global crisis. 
Next section of this paper outline the theory and concept of policy mix, the interest rate 
and exchange rate, financial stability, macroprudential policy, and the management of capital 
flow. Section three outline the method, while section four provide the result and analysis. 
Conclusion is presented section five and will close the presentation of this paper. 
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II. THEORY
Towards Central Bank Policy Mix
How central bank integrates monetary policy, macroprudential policy, and capital flows 
management in its policy mix to carry the dual mandates of achieving price stability and 
promoting financial stability? The already established monetary policy framework in the central 
banks provides strong basis for this. More than last two decades, the central banks have been 
successful in delivering price stability in many countries, both advanced and the EMEs. In part 
this reflects the intense sharing experiences around the close central bank community, and 
in other part it is supported by the credible adoption of inflation targeting framework. This 
framework has been successful in bringing down long-term trend of inflation, higher output, 
and declining interest rates in many countries (Berg, et. al., 2013). A number of key features of 
the framework that support the monetary policy credibility includes: clarity of inflation target 
to be achieved, rigorous macroeconomic forecasting and policy analysis models, consistency of 
the interest rate to achieve the target, independency of the central bank, formal and regular 
decision making process, publication of inflation forecast and other modes of communication 
to anchor inflation expectation. To carry the additional mandate of promoting financial stability, 
what needs to be done is to enlarge the framework by incoporating macro-financial linkages, 
particularly through the financial system and capital flows, into the macroeconomic forecasting 
and policy analysis. This will provides the basis for formulating the monetary response, as well 
as macroprudential policy and capital flows management that are needed to achieve price 
stability and promote financial stability. 
Central Bank’s Mandate of Financial Stability
There has been now strong supports for the central banks to assume a role in promoting financial 
system stability (BIS, 2011). But what is financial stability? Even though academic literature 
already brought the issue of ‘financial instability’ dated back to the writing of Minsky (1982), 
the global crisis of 2007-2008 make it becomes increasingly serious concerns for policy makers 
around the globe. The precise definition of ‘financial stability’ differs among academicians 
and policy makers, but it generally refers to condition in which the financial system functions 
effectively and efficienty in the economy and resilience in withstanding shocks from both 
domestic and overseas. Some literature define it in contrast to the conditions that could lead 
to a financial crisis. Allen and Wood (2006), for instance, referred to ‘financial instability’ as 
“episodes in which a large number of parties, whether they are households, companies or 
governments, experience financial crises which are not warranted by their previous behavior 
and where these crises collectively have seriously adverse macroeconomic effects”. ‘Financial 
stability’ is then described as “a state of affairs in which an episode of financial instability is 
unlikely to occur.” More practical definitions can be found in many central banks. For instance, 
the European Central Bank (ECB) defines ‘financial stability’ as a condition in which the financial 
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system – intermediaries, markets and market infrastructures – can withstand shocks without 
major disruption in financial intermediation and in the general supply of financial services.
From the definitions, there are four key aspects that need to be stressed. First, soundness 
of individual financial institutions is necessary but not sufficient. Financial stability relates to 
how the system functions for and able to withstand the shocks from macroeconomy. It is more 
about macro-financial linkages of the financial system than the soundness of individual financial 
institutions. Second, history tells us that causes of financial crisis are many, but four are the most 
common: asset (financial and housing) bubbles, credit booms, excessive debt accumulation, 
and sudden stop of capital flows (Reinhart and Rogoff, 2009; Claessens and Kose, 2013). These 
macro-financial imbalances tend to be procyclical and propagate the boom-bust of financial 
cycles in relation to economic cycles, and in most cases precede the financial crises (Claessens, 
et. al., 2011; Jorda, et. al., 2011). We witness these in Latin America crisis, Asia crisis, US crisis, 
Europe crisis, and the recent global crisis. 
Third, while a financial crisis could emanated from macroeconomy shocks or individual 
failure of financial institution, its contagion to a systemic crisis evolves through interconnection 
and networks in the financial markets and infrastructures (Allen, et. al., 2010; Acemoglu, 
et.al., 2015). Currency crises, for instance, can be caused by sudden stop of capital flows and 
then spread out to financial system failures because of foreign exchange market freeze (Calvo 
and Reinhart, 2000). Similarly, bank runs could lead to bank contagion because of liquidity 
squeeze in the inter-bank money market (Freixas, et. al., 2000; Morris and Shin, 2004). Fourth, 
propagation that follows and leads to full-blown and wide-spread financial crisis commonly 
accelerates through information contagion and herding behavior (Acharya and Yorulmazer, 
2003; Bikhchandani and Sharma, 2001). The crisis in the US sub-prime mortgage show how its 
contagion escalates through fire sales in the financial market and credit squeeze in the banking 
system (Diamond and Rajan, 2010). Information contagion and herding behavior then lead 
to wide-spread and multifaceted financial crises, not only in the US, but also in Europe and 
around the globe.
Considering the wide range and large negative impacts of a crisis, financial system 
stability is clearly a shared responsibility. There is no single institution could and should be 
left alone for assuming this function. There is a need, and now it becomes common practices 
in many countries, to have a coordination institution or mechanism for overseeing overall 
financial stability at the national level. Financial supervisory authority, be it in the central bank 
or a specialized institution, assumes a responsibility for the soundness of individual financial 
institutions through its microprudential regulation and supervision. The central bank assumes 
responsibility of the macroprudential regulation and supervision for mitigating macro-financial 
imbalances and systemic risks of the financial system, in addition to its functions of monetary 
policy, payments system, and as lender of the last resort. Deposit insurance institution has the 
role for mitigating the impact of information contagion of bank runs and participate in the 
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early intervention and resolution of problem banks. And the government, through the ministry 
of finance, needs to lead the national financial system stability as to prevent the crisis to pose 
severe detrimental effects to the economy and heavy fiscal burdens. 
A country’s central bank is well qualified to assume macroprudential function for regulating 
and supervising financial stability from the point of view of its surveillance capacity and the 
policy tools at its disposal (Kawai and Morgan, 2012). Furthermore, the study from 13 developed 
and emerging countries by Bank for International Settlements, BIS (2011) concluded that the 
central banks must be involved in the formulation and execution of financial stability policy 
if such policy to be effective. There are three key reasons why central banks should assume 
macroprudential policy. First, the performance of their monetary policy functions provides central 
banks with macroeconomic focus and an understanding of financial markets, institutions and 
infrastructures needed for the exercise of macroprudential policy. Second, financial instability 
can be caused by and affect macroeconomic performances, with substantial consequences for 
economic activity, price stability and monetary policy transmission. And third, central banks are 
the ultimate source of liquidity for the economy, through its monetary policy and lender of the 
last resort functions, and appropriate liquidity provision is crucial for financial system stability. 
How the central bank incorporates its macroprudential policy for financial stability in its 
policy making together with its monetary policy and payment systems? This is where central bank 
policy mix becomes important. For achieving price stability and supporting financial stability, the 
central banks should not only assess macroeconomic outlooks but also address macro-financial 
imbalances in the financial system. They are commonly emerge in the procyclicality and build-up 
systemic risks of asset (financial and housing) bubbles, credit booms, accumulation of external 
debts, and volatility of capital flows. That said, the following three key concepts constitute the 
building block of the central bank’s policy mix. 
•	 First,	monetary	policy	needs	to	be	directed	for	achieving	price	stability,	with	pay	due	regard	
to asset (financial and housing) prices, be it directly or indirectly. As we know, asset prices 
bubbles commonly build-up during economic upswing and then bursts that lead to financial 
crisis and economic recession. 
•	 Second,	macroprudential	policy	constitutes	regulation	and	supervision	to	financial	services	
institution from macro perspectives and focuses on systemic risks required for promoting 
financial system stability. It is geared toward mitigating procyclicality of the financial system 
(time-dimension), as well as build-up systemic risks that emanate from the interconnectedness 
and networks of financial institutions, markets and infrastructures, including payment 
systems (cross-section dimension). 
•	 Third,	capital	flows	management	is	directed	to	mitigate	procyclicality	and	build-up	systemic	
risks from accumulation of external debt and volatility of capital flows. It supports the stability 
of exchange rate and helps in preventing balance of payments crisis and sudden-stop capital 
flows that constitute key parts of maintaining financial stability.
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Financial market deepening is very important to support the policy mix. As we know, more 
developed financial market will strengthen the effectiveness of monetary policy transmissions. 
It also facilitates product innovation and risk diversification in the financial system to support 
economic financing and financial stability, as well as better absorbs the benefits and reduce 
the risks of volatile capital flows. Sound prudential measures and appropriate market conducts, 
nonetheless, need also be strengthened to ensure deepened financial markets would not 
pose greater risks to monetary and financial stability. As will be discussed in the next sections, 
greater diversification and product innovation could induce higher systemic risks to financial 
stability as networks of financial institutions, markets, and infrastructure becomes closer 
interconnected. 
The central bank policy mix is conceptually coherent and practically implementable. 
The challenge is how to internalize it into integrated policy formulation process in the central 
bank, supported by, among others, enhanced forecasting model and decision making process. 
It should be noted that for financial stability, as alluded to above, the central bank’s role and 
function in macroprudential policy needs to be put as an integral part of overall financial stability 
policy coordination at the national level. Equally important, the central bank needs to be clear 
in its communication about to which policy addresses to what objective, based on the policy 
assignment and exercises in the policy mix. 
Monetary Policy And Financial Stability
How financial stability can be incorporated into the monetary policy framework? There are at 
least two issues to be addressed, i.e.: (i) incorporation of asset (financial and housing) prices into 
new dimension of price stability, and (ii) how monetary response to emerging macro-financial 
imbalances and systemic risks of financial stability. On the first issue, there was debate about 
whether the Fed long-standing success of low inflation and interest rate was one of the causes 
of the recent crisis in the US. Taylor (2010), for example, argued that the Fed’s monetary policy 
stance was too easy, in that it kept the federal funds rate too low for too long, fueling the 
housing boom and other economic imbalances. Bernanke (2010), on the other hand, disputed 
this view. The primary cause of housing bubbles was because of exotic types of mortgages and 
the associated decline of underwriting standards, so that the best response to the housing bubble 
would have been regulatory, not monetary. Filardo (2001), in other side, found that monetary 
authority should respond to asset prices as long as asset prices contain reliable information about 
inflation and output, even if a monetary authority cannot distinguish between fundamental 
and bubble asset price behavior.
Subsequent empirical findings, however, have fundamentally changed for the supports 
of central bank policy to response to housing prices in the post-global crisis. Jorda, et. al. 
(2014), for instance, provide an important evidence on the link between monetary conditions, 
credit growth, and house prices using data spanning 140 years of economic history across 14 
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advanced economies. In particular, an exogenous 1 percentage decrease in the short-term 
interest rate elevates the ratios of housing price to income and mortgage loans to GDP by 
about 4% and 3%, respectively, within four years. These historical insights suggest that the 
potentially destabilizing by-products of easy money must be taken seriously against the benefits 
of stimulating unsustainable economic activity. Williams (2015), however, warns that there is 
a very costly tradeoff of using monetary policy to affect housing prices when macroeconomic 
and financial stability goals are in conflict. Using the same data, he shows that 1 percentage 
increase in interest rates tends to lower real (inflation-adjusted) housing prices by over 6% 
within two years, while real GDP per capita declines by nearly 2%. These empirical findings 
show that central banks need to strike a right balance between price stability and financial 
stability when formulating its monetary policy
The preceding findings lead to the second issue on how monetary policy respond to 
macro-financial imbalances and build-up systemic risks reflected in the procyclicality of housing 
bubbles, credit booms, accumulation of external debts, and capital flows volatility. This issue is 
closely related to the “lean versus clean” debate: whether it is preferable for the central banks 
to “leaning against the wind” to manage the bubbles from bursting, or they are better to wait 
until the bubble bursts and then “clean” up the mess afterward via aggressive monetary policy 
easing. The “clean” school was adopted by the US Fed under Chairman Greenspan. There are 
a number of reasons for this view: investment booms were generating by productivity, bubbles 
may be resulted from declining risk premium and irrational exuberance, and raising interest 
rate may be ineffective in restraining the bubbles but could cause a bubble to burst severely, 
thus damaging the economy (Greenspan, 2002). 
However, global financial crisis have undermined these arguments. The crisis clearly 
unveils the potential risks of excessive credit and leverage driven bubbles, and thus provides 
supports for the “leaning”, rather than cleaning, to prevent such bubbles. The experience in 
Australia, for instance, shows the leaning could be done and successful. Increasingly concerned 
about excessive lending in the housing sector in 2002 and 2003, the central bank gradually 
raised interest rates, even though the outlook for inflation was benign (Bloxham, et. al., 2011). 
While justify its tightening decision within the framework of inflation targeting, the central 
bank repeatedly expressed concerns about high credit growth. The consensus has now swung 
strongly for the central banks in many countries to paying close attention to financial stability 
and leaning against the wind, even if it is not an official part of their mandate. Bernanke 
(2009), for instance, stated that the Fed played a major part in arresting the crisis, and it should 
preserve the institution’s ability to foster financial stability and to promote economic recovery 
without inflation.
Growing literatures have been devoted to incorporate financial stability into inflation 
targeting framework of monetary policy. Agenor and da Silva (2013) discuss the integrated 
inflation targeting regime that incorporates financial stability. In particular, in addition to 
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inflation and output gaps, monetary policy should react to credit gap and real exchange rate 
to address the time-series dimension of systemic risks. Monetary policy and macroprudential 
policy are largely complementary instruments, and thus must be calibrated jointly in the context 
of macroeconomic models that account for credit market imperfections and effectiveness of 
monetary transmissions. Woodford (2012) shows the optimal solution for monetary policy when 
the central bank willing to trade-off a greater degree of stability in price and output-gap for the 
sake of stabilizing systemic risks of financial stability. Vredin (2015) provides detail descriptions 
on relevant information for the central bank to incorporate financial stability into the inflation 
targeting framework. In particular, in addition to macroeconomic, financial conditions and 
transmission mechanisms, indicators of financial stability relating to financial cycles, financial 
market vulnerability, and early warning signals would be useful. 
Macroprudential Policy 
As stated above, macroprudential policy constitutes regulation and supervision to financial 
services institutions from macro perspectives and focus on systemic risks required for 
promoting financial system stability. It is particularly geared toward mitigating procyclicality 
from macro-financial linkages, as well as build-up systemic risks that could emanate from the 
interconnectedness and networks of financial institutions, markets and infrastructures, including 
payment systems. The first objective of macroprudential policies aims to prevent the excessive 
build-up of risks from the boom and bust of the financial cycles resulting from external factors 
and market failures (time dimension). The second objective is to make the financial sector more 
resilient and limit contagion effects from interconnectedness and networks of the financial 
system (cross-section dimension). These two key objectives constitute the main factors that 
precede and propagate the instability in the financial system that in many cases lead to a 
crisis. Another objective of macroprudential, e.g. by the ECB, is to encourage a system-wide 
perspective in financial regulation to create the right set of incentives and disincentives for 
market participants (structural dimension). This is important as to manage risk taking behaviour 
that is a key for both the soundness of individual financial institution as well as for mitigating 
build-up systemic risks.
A number of studies have documented that the financial cycles tend to be procyclical and 
amplify the economic cycles (Claessens, et.al, 2011). They tend to precede and propagate build-
up systemic risks in the financial system that could lead to a crisis (Claessens and Kose, 2013; 
Reinhart and Rogoff, 2009)). Empirical studies also reveals four main procyclicality systemic risks 
that in many cases lead to financial crises: housing bubles, credit booms, excessive accumulation 
of external debts, and volatile capital flows (Jorda, et.al., 2011, 2014; Calvo and Reinhart, 2000). 
They are inherent within capitalist economy whereby inflation and debt accumulation have the 
potential to spin out of control in the period of economic upswing (Minsky, 1982). Stability is 
destabilizing, and thus leads to ‘boom’ and ‘bust’ in the financial cycles, causing the economy 
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falls into crisis. Macroprudential policy addresses the first two procyclicalities (housing bubles 
and credit booms) while the other two (external debts and volatility of capital flows) are dealth 
with capital flows management discussed in the next section.
Interconnectedness and networks in the financial system could also lead to build-up 
systemic risks during the economic upswing along with procyclicality of the financial cycles 
discussed above. As explained earlier, during financial distress, contagion and propagation to 
a systemic crisis evolve through interconnection and networks in the financial markets (e.g. 
interbank and foreign exchange markets) and infrastructures (including payments system) that 
lead to liquidity squeeze and market freeze. During the period of economic upswing, financial 
interconnection and networks could also propagate the upswing of financial cycles into build-up 
systemic risks. Potfolio diversification beyond certain thresshold increase the risks of financial 
system failures, even though it may benefits the risk distribution from individual institution. It 
resembles to complete financial networks that are prone to systemic failures from large shocks 
or multiple/common shocks (Allen, et. al., 2010; Acemoglu, et.al., 2015). The originate-to-
distribute bank model in the case of US sub-prime morgage failure is a clear example. 
Propagation of build-up systemick risks during the upswing of financial cycles could also be 
facilitated through herding behaviour (Bikhchandani and Sharma, 2001). This can be happenning 
due to a number of reasons. Some banks or investors, especially those with limited information, 
tend to base their decisions on other reputable banks or investors or advisors rather than their 
own analysis. Performance measurement system that lead to remuneration and bonus on profit 
or based on the certain performance benchmark that is commonly practiced in the financial 
system is another factor behind herding behaviour. In the banking system, Rajan (1994) shows 
that reputation and remuneration system could lead to fluctuations of lending standard, i.e. 
tends to ease during upward economic trend and tight during recession. In addition, as in the 
event of financial distress, information contagion could also lead to herding behavior during 
the upswing financial cycles (Acharya and Yorulmazer, 2003). 
These objectives of macroprudential policy, i.e. macro-perspective and systemick risk 
focus of financial stability, differs from microprudential regulation and supervision which aim 
at the soundness of individual financial institutions, banks and non-banks. Individual institution 
soundness is necessary for financial stability, but not sufficient. Individual failure of financial 
institutions, if it is not deemed systemic, could be regarded as a problem of capital insolvency 
due to excessive risk taking, mis-management, and/or loosing competition. This is also as a 
natural process of banking restructuring and a test for the resiliency of the overall financial 
system. The case is different to those that are deemed as systemically important banks, which 
their failures could potentially cause financial instability. BIS (2012) provides a framework for 
assesing and dealing with domestic systemically important banks based on four main criteria, 
i.e.: size, interconnectedness, complexity, and substitutiability. They are subjected to stringent 
rules of regulation and supervision to make them internalize and absorb the systemic risks, 
389Central Bank Policy Mix: Key Concepts and Indonesia’s Experience
including, among others, higher liquidity coverage, total loss absorptive capacity of capital, 
stricter risk management framework, and requirement for adhering the set-out recovery and 
resolution plan.
Instruments of macroprudential policy for addressing procyclicality could include loan-
to-value ratio for managing credit cycles and counter-cyclical capital buffer, while limits on 
foreign exchange exposures and offshore borrowing are examples for systemic risks instruments. 
Microprudential instruments consitutes measures for rating individual bank soundness, 
managing liquidity risks, minimum capital requirement based on risk profile, and prudent risk 
management. A number of instruments of both macro and micro regulations may be the same, 
as they are based on the assesments of liquidity, market, and credit risks. But the objective 
and perspective of the two regulations differ. The objective of macroprudential regulation is to 
limit system-wide distress and avoid macroeconomic costs linked to financial instability, while 
microprudential regulation aims at limiting distress of individual financial institutions to provide 
protections to consumers (depositors and investors). For some possible common instruments, 
there are three dimensions that need to be considered, i.e.: individual soundness, systemic risk, 
and procycliclicality. Thus, for every common instrument could be set the levels that represent 
requirements from individual soundness, systemic risk, and procyclicality based on assessment 
of the financial stability during the period. This point of view could be used as an approach 
for resolving any instrument of regulations that have two objectives of both microprudential 
and macroprudential. 
Recent regulation on capital by the Financial Stability Board (FSB) issued on November 
2015 which sets out minimum amounts of Total Loss Absorbency Capacity (TLAC) for Global 
Systemically Important Banks (G-SIBs) is an example of this approach. The TLAC is to ensure 
that G-SIBs have the loss absorbing and recapitalization capacity so that, in and immediately 
following resolution, critical functions can continue without requiring taxpayer support or 
threatening financial stability. The TLAC is set at 16% to 20% of the capital requirement based 
on the risk weighted assets and at 6% to 6.75% of the capital requirement based on the total 
exposure measurement. This applies to G-SIBs that are determined before 2015. First, the Basel 
III minimum of an 8% total capital ratio based on risk profile must be satisfied for all banks, 
systemic or not. This level of capital is purely for individual bank soundness. Second, the various 
Basel III buffer requirements must also be met, i.e.: capital conservation buffer for systemic risks, 
counter-cyclical capital buffer for addressing procyclicality, and capital surcharge for G-SIBs. 
The level of counter-cyclical buffer could be set higher or lower according to the extent of 
procyclicality at certain period. And third, additional regulatory capital and debt instruments with 
a minimum remaining maturity of one year that are subordinated to all other creditor claims 
in insolvency (eligible debt instruments) can then be included in the TLAC. Such approach of 
structuring regulation according to the objectives of individual soundness, systemic risk, and 
procycliclicality could also be applied to other instruments that are both microprudential and 
macroprudential in natures. 
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Capital Flows Management
Capital flows management (CFM) aims to mitigate procyclicality and build-up systemic risks 
from accumulation of external debt and volatility of capital flows. It supports the stability of 
exchange rate as well as helps in preventing balance of payments and sudden-stop crises 
that constitute integral part of financial stability. That capital flows have many benefits to the 
economy are widely aknowledged (Koepke, 2015). FDI and long-term banking flows could 
facilitate domestic investments and, if they are accompanied by productivity in the economy, 
increase growth. Nonetheless, some banking and portfolio flows are volatile, particularly those 
of short-term and speculative natures, and could pose risks to macroeconomic and financial 
system stability. These flows could surge in some period and reverse in other period, responding 
to relative magnitude between “push factors” of global output, interest rate and risk aversion 
in one side, and “pull factors” of domestic output, asset returns, and country risk in the other 
side. The surge of capital inflows to the EMEs during the period since the global crisis and their 
reversals following the Fed tapper tantrum in mid-2013 provide a clear example. Increasing 
volatility of capital flows poses central banks in the EMEs serious challenges in safeguarding 
monetary and financial stability.
The best defence for the EMEs to better absorb capital flows and reap their benefits is 
by implementing sound macroeconomic policies, exchange rate flexibility, deepening financial 
markets, strengthening financial regulation and supervision, and improving institutional capacity 
(IMF, 2012, 2013, 2015). But surges of inflows can lead to macroeconomic and financial 
instability, signs of economic overheating or asset bubles, strong currency appreciation, rapid 
credit expansion, and build-ups systemic risks in balance sheet and other vulnerabilities that 
can induce sudden-stops or reversals of these inflows. Under such circumstances, interest rate 
increase will not be effective as it will induce more capital inflows, especially when inflation is 
under controlled. Foreign exchange intervention could moderate exchange rate appreciation 
and at the same time increase the international reserves for building up buffers in case of capital 
reversals. Increasing reserve requirements could absorb excess liquidity in the domestic banking 
system from capital inflows. To support these policies, the CFM could be implemented in the 
forms of tax on portfolio equity and debt inflows (Brazil, 2009), holding period on central bank 
bills and limit on short-term foreign borrowing by banks (Indonesia, 2011), withholding tax on 
interest income on nonresident purchases of treasury and monetary stabilization bonds (Korea, 
2011), fee on nonresident purchases of central bank paper (Peru, 2010), or withholding tax on 
nonresidents’ interest earnings and capital gains on new purchases of state bonds (Thailand, 
2010).
Similarly, large, sustained, or sudden outflows can give rise to macroeconomic and 
financial stability risks. In this regards, increasing interest rate can be used, especially when 
there is pressure to inflation. Foreign exchange intervention could moderate exchange rate 
depreciation, as long as it does not cause serious depletion on the adequacy of international 
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reserves. Reducing reserve requirement is also an option, and relaxation of the existing CFM 
could be implemented. Additional CFM measures could include imposition of 12-month waiting 
period for nonresidents to convert proceeds from the sale of securities (Malaysia, 1998), limits 
on forward transactions and introduction of export surrender requirements (Thailand, 1997), 
limit bank withdrawals and imposed restrictions on transfers and loans in foreign currency 
(Argentina, 2001), stop of convertibility of domestic currency accounts for capital transactions 
(Iceland, 2008), and a 5-day waiting period for nonresidents to convert local currency proceeds 
from investment transaction to foreign currency (Ukraine, 2008).
III. INDONESIA’S EXPERIENCE 
Macroeconomic Setting
Indonesia is an inflation targeting country, introduced in 2003 and implemented strictly since 
2005. The framework suits well in bringing down inflation from about 9% in 2003 to now 
within the target range of 4±1%. With subsidy has been revamped at the end of 2014—the 
main factor behind high administered prices shocks in the past, inflation will be more under 
controlled and continued on the declining trend toward a medium-target of 3±1%. From 
the institutional aspect, the framework has been successful for the central bank in gaining 
monetary policy credibility. The discipline that it brings to the formal and regular policy 
forecasting and decision making process in the monthly board meetings put the central bank 
in forefront in keep updating the macroeconomic outlook and policy responses needed for 
achieving price stability. These regular assessments also serve well for close policy coordination 
between the central bank and government in formulating fiscal, monetary and structural 
reforms to safeguard macroeconomic stability and supporting economic growth. Moreover, 
the aggressive communication by the central bank provides important instrument to anchor 
inflation expectation as well as broader macroeconomic outlooks. Overall, the already established 
framework provides strong foundation for the central bank to assume macroprudental policy 
for promoting financial system stability.
The challenges for the success of implementing central bank policy mix in Indonesia 
come from both domestic and external. First, the Indonesian economy is widespread through 
archipelagoes and dependence on commodity, and thus subjected to recurrent shocks from 
foods prices inflation and current account imbalances. Addressing these internal and external 
imbalances through monetary policy is a key for the success of maintaining both macroeconomic 
and financial stability. Second, the financial system is bank dependenced with shallow 
financial market. Managing procyclicality and systemic risks of the banking system through 
macroprudential regulation and supervision not only will be a key for financial stability but also 
strengthen the effectiveness of monetary transmissions. And third, Indonesia is small economy 
with fully open capital account, and thus management of volatile capital flows is very important. 
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These three challenges of monetary policy, macroprudential policy, and the CFM needs to be 
addressed in the central bank policy mix. 
Furthermore, these challenges are closely linked and intertwined, making the policy mix 
even become utmost requirement. During economic upswing, e.g. because of commodity prices 
boom, financial deregulation, or favorable global environment, accelerated domestic demand 
then created credit boom, property bubbles, high inflation, widening current account deficit, and 
accumulation of external debt. We witness this in the history of big and mini crises in Indonesia. 
The economic bonanza following the broad based financial deregulation during 1983-1988 
ended up in deep crisis in 1997-1998 which unveils those serious macro-financial systemic risks. 
The mini crisis in 2005 was led by rapid growth of domestic demand, bank lending, and large 
capital inflows following global commodity boom. We also record recurrent problems during 
2010-2013 whereby commodity export induced domestic demand acceleration created large 
current account deficit when commodity cycle was sharply reversed. These macro-financial 
imbalances could not be resolved either by monetary policy, CFM, or even by microprudential 
regulation and supervision. Macroprudential policy is the additional instrument, and it needs 
to be integrated with monetary policy and the CFM of the central bank.
Bank Indonesia’s Policy Mix
As discussed above, two issues are of particular important to incorporate financial stability 
issues in monetary policy under (flexible) inflation targeting, i.e.: (i) enlarging the scope of 
price stability to include assessment of asset (financial and housing) prices, and (ii) addressing 
procyclicality and build-up systemic risks in the macro-financial linkages. For the first issue, in 
addition to CPI inflation, we put particularly emphasis on the assessment of exchange rate, 
government bond yield and equity prices, and housing prices. For the exchange rate, we 
already incorporate it into our macroeconomic forecasting and policy analysis model in setting 
monetary policy response. Consistent with the inflation targeting framework, the ultimate 
objective remains the CPI inflation. The inclusion of exchange rate in the model provides useful 
exercises on the consistency of (market-based) exchange rate and guidance on exchange rate 
policy to deal with possible excessive misalignment that is risking both the achievement of 
the inflation target and in support for financial stability. On the other asset prices, we opt to 
analyze them separately (outside the model), but they enrich our understanding on the overall 
macroeconomic forecasting and what monetary and/or macroprudential instruments that are 
best suited to address emerging risks. 
On the second issue, to enrich our better understanding of macro-financial linkages, 
we enlarge our macroeconomic forecasting model to include external default risk as a proxy 
for sudden-stops and credit gaps to measure procyclicality in the banking system (Harmanta, 
et.al, 2012, 2013). The model provides policy scenarios with the interest rate response (Taylor 
rule type) and reserve requirement from monetary policy and/or loan-to-value ratio as possible 
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macroprudential instruments. Since the forecasting model is forward looking, it sheds important 
considerations on how best to lean against the possible risks from sudden stops and build-up 
systemic risk of financial stability, i.e.: through monetary policy interest rate or macroprudential 
measures or combination of the two. To sharpen our understanding on the procyclicality and 
macro-financial cycles, particularly credit booms and housing bubbles, we run separate models 
for assessing the nature of their cycles and possible build-up systemic risks that are foreseen 
over the policy horizon, at the aggregate level and cross-section (Alamsyah et.al, 2014; Harun 
et.al, 2014).
From the financial stability perspectives, we run in-depth assessments that are suggested 
in the literature (Bisias, 2012) and practiced in a number of central banks (e.g. EBA, 2015). We 
focus on systemic risks assessment (not individual soundness rating) of systemically important 
banks, both from top-down and bottom-up approach, of their key risks of capital, asset quality, 
liquidity risk, market risk, and earnings. Assessments on the inter-connectedness of those 
banks in the interbank market and payment system are also conducted. Tail-risk analyses on 
the credit risk are performed by several methods such as probability of default and transition 
matrix of asset quality. Stress-test of financial stability to the banking system on its resilience 
to macroeconomic shocks through integrated and/or balanced approaches based on the risk 
survey that we introduces. Risk assessments are also conducted to corporate and household 
balance sheets on their financial performances on how theses would impact to the banking 
system risks. To facilitate theses assessment of macro-financial linkages among the financial 
system, both from the procyclicality and build-up systemic risks, we are developing statistics 
on balance sheets interlinkages among economic agents and financial system, both public and 
private, at the national level and cross-geographical within sub-national levels.
 Based on the overall assessment of monetary policy forecasting and analysis as well as of 
time-dimension and cross-section of financial systemic risk assessments, the central bank policy 
mix consists of the following four main instruments (Warjiyo, 2014a, 2015b). First, as in the 
inflation targeting framework, interest rate is set to ensure that inflation forecast to fall within 
the targeting range, i.e. at 4±1% in 2016 and 2017. Second, exchange rate policy is geared 
toward maintaining the stability of exchange rate movements along its fundamental trend to 
ensure their consistency with the achievement of inflation target and to avert their excessive 
volatility that may put pressures on the financial stability. Third, capital flows management 
is conducted to support the exchange rate policy, particularly in the period of large surge of 
capital inflows and heightened risks of capital reversals, for achieving monetary and financial 
stability. Fourth, macroprudential policy is geared towards maintaining financial stability and 
supporting the effectiveness of monetary policy transmission. Financial market deepening is also 
accelerated to support the effectiveness of the policy mix. The central bank is also engaging close 
coordination with the government, both at the central and sub-nationals, for macroeconomic 
management, as well as with financial services authority and deposit insurance institutions on 
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matters relating to the national financial system stability. Clear communication is very important 
for the success of the policy mix. 
A key question is how to mix the monetary and macroprudential policies in responding 
to different cases that may give rise to conflict between price stability and financial stability 
objectives. This is an open debate as it deviates from the Tinbergen rule of one instrument 
for one policy objective. But there is convergence view that there are many cases that both 
instruments are complimentary for achieving both objectives (Yellen, 2014). The following 
table presents four cases of price stability and financial stability risks based on forward looking 
macroeconomic and macro-financial forecast and analysis over the policy horizon, and their 
corresponding mix of monetary and macroprudential policy stances. At the first quadrant, where 
forecasted risks to both price and financial stability are low, it is natural that both monetary and 
macroprudential policy stances are neutral. At the other extreme of fourth quadrant, where 
forecasted risks to both price and financial stability are high, it is natural that both monetary 























The potential conflicts are in the second and third quadrants. In the second quadrant, 
where forecasted risks of price stability is low but of financial stability is high, the stance of 
macroprudential policy is clearly tight. In this case, monetary policy could help macroprudential 
policy in leaning against the forecasted risks of financial stability in the policy horizon. This is 
the case in the US in the period preceding the global crisis as debated between Taylor (2010) 
and Bernanke (2010) as discussed above. In the third quadrant, where forecasted risks of price 
stability is high but of financial stability is low, the stance of monetary policy is clearly tight. In 
this case, macroprudential policy could help monetary policy in leaning against the forecasted 
risks of price stability in the policy horizon. The extent to which and choice of macroprudential 
measures will depend on the factors that give rise to forecasted risks of price stability. A 
natural selection could be directed toward reinforcing the channels of monetary transmissions 
in safeguarding price stability. For instance, where risks to price stability stems from strong 
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domestic demand induced by bank lending to housing sector, a loan to value ratio targeted to 
these sector is an option to be considered.
The factual problems in the real world may not be as simple as just described, of course. 
But we think this approach could be used as useful guiding principles to address the possible 
conflicts that may arise between price and financial stability objectives. Again, the extent to 
which and choice of monetary and macroprudential measures will naturally depend on the 
corresponding factors that give rise to forecasted risks of price and financial stability in the 
respective countries. We also think the same approach could be used to address the policy 
trilemma of monetary independence in achieving price stability, exchange rate stability, and 
capital mobility as we know in the international finance (Obstfeld, 2015). The following sub-
sections will discussed how we implement this approach and the choice of instruments in the 
central bank policy mix in managing monetary and financial stability in Indonesia during the 
periods of heighten global economic and financial turbulences since the global crisis.
Interest Rate And Exchange Rate Policies
Under the inflation targeting framework, our decision on interest rate is to ensure the 
achievement of inflation target. The issue is how to deal with exchange rate movements that 
may give rise to the risks of forecasted inflation off the target. This is particularly the case for 
many EMEs when facing unprecedented large volatility of capital flows since the global crisis. 
In contrast to the advanced countries, exchange rate stability matters for the EMEs due to a 
number of reasons, e.g. under-developed domestic financial market, their detrimental effects to 
banking conditions and financial stability, and rigidity in the economy. Under such circumstances, 
dual targeting of exchange rate for achieving the inflation target will strengthen the monetary 
policy credibility under the inflation targeting framework (Ostry et. al., 2012). Specifically, 
exchange rate targeting could be used to mitigate the unintended impacts of capital flows to 
the inflation target, both directly via exchange rate pass-through and indirectly through domestic 
demand. Many EMEs have included exchange rate in the Taylor rule (Mohanty and Klau, 2004; 
Aizenmann et. al., 2011). Foreign exchange intervention is another option. When capital flows 
causing significant exchange rate misaligned from its fundamental and inflation will be off the 
target, a combination of interest rate responses and foreign exchange intervention would be 
more effective and thus strengthen monetary policy credibility.
We adopt this approach since 2010 and find it superior than the standard inflation 
targeting relying solely on interest rate. Three episodes since the global crisis provide evidences, 
i.e. the period of 2010 to the Fed tantrum in May 2013, the period since the Fed tapper 
tantrum to mid-2015, and the period since then. During the first period, Indonesia enjoys most 
of the favorable spillovers from the global crisis, particularly high commodity prices and surge 
in capital inflows (Warjiyo, 2013b). Economic growth was high at the peak of 6.5% in 2011 
and moderate slightly at 6.3% in 2012. Inflation was at the lowest history of 3.8% in 2011, 
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even below the lower bound of the target of 5±1% at that time, and only slightly increased 
to 4.3% in 2012. During this period, Indonesia received large capital inflows, driven by both 
global excess liquidity searching for higher yield and Indonesia promising economic outlook. 
Exchange rate appreciated by the surge in capital inflows, corroborated with favorable current 
account surplus from the high global commodity prices. The challenge is how to manage these 
inflows to mitigate build-up systemic to financial stability as bank lending growth was high at 
above 23% per year during 2010-2012. This is the case of second quadrant where the risks of 
price stability are low while of financial stability are high as discussed above. 
Consistent with the inflation targeting framework, the central bank cut the policy rate 
by 75 bps from 6.5% in 2010 to 5.75% in 2012. Further cuts of policy rate would not be 
consistent with the inflation targeting framework as inflation at the historically low. It would 
not be effective in stemming the capital inflows driven more by ‘push factors’ than ‘pull factors’ 
(Indrawan et.al, 2013). And it was also not consistent with the financial stability objective as bank 
lending growth was excessively high. The central bank intervene in the foreign exchange market 
to stem the surge in capital inflows as well as to moderate the exchange rate appreciation. To 
sterilize its impact to domestic liquidity more effectively, reserve requirement was raised from 
5% to 8% in November 2011. The international reserves increased significantly from a mere 
of US$ 66.2 billion at the beginning of 2010 to the peak of US$112.8 billion in 2012. It turned 
out that the increase of reserves provided important buffers for the capital reversals following 
the Fed tapper tantrum in mid of 2013. 
 The situation was then reversed. Large capital reversals immediately followed the 
surprise Fed tapper announcement, running over the months of May to August of 2013. The 
sudden reversals from both government bonds and equity markets in such a short period created 
herding behavior that was put both monetary and financial stability at risks (Warjiyo, 2014b). 
The problem was aggravated by widening current account deficit at the peak 4.4% of GDP as 
exports fall due to the plunge of global commodity prices while imports continued to increase 
at the back of strong domestic demand. Inflation surge to 8.4% in 2013 as the government 
raised the fuel price in July 2013 and to 8.3% in 2014 as fuel subsidy was removed in October 
2014. From financial stability, bank lending growth was still high at 21.4% in 2013. This is the 
case of fourth quadrant as risks to both price and financial stability were high.
 The central bank responded swiftly to stabilize the situation: raising interest rate and 
tightening macroprudential. Indonesia is among the first central bank that ahead of the curve 
raised its policy rate in the aftermath of Fed tapper tantrum. We started to increase the policy 
rate by 25 bps in June 2013, and then aggressively raised it consecutively in the following 
months with a total of 175 bps to 7.50% within six months to November 2013. The primary 
objective was to preemptively contain the inflation pressures stemming from fuel price hike. The 
aggressive moves also to slow down the domestic demand to reign in current account deficit. 
Timing of the decisions were perfectly match the needs to respond to the capital reversals. We 
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believe bold and aggressive response in interest rate is a key to send a strong and clear signal 
to the market for monetary policy credibility. 
The central bank also intervened heavily in the right aftermath of the Fed tapper tantrum 
to stabilize the exchange rate before it resumed since September 2013. The intervention caused 
the reserves to fall to the lowest of US$ 92 billion in September 2013 before it recover to 
US$99 billion at the end of 2013. The intervention is supported by central bank purchases of 
the government bonds in the secondary market, especially during the period of heavy capital 
reversals, a tactic that we call dual intervention (Warjiyo, 2013c). This is in essence to make 
sterilization more effective, as purchasing bonds from secondary market release the liquidity 
squeeze because of capital reversals that could not be compensated by foreign exchange 
intervention. It also strengthens the effectiveness of intervention in stabilizing the exchange 
rate. The central bank send clear signals to stand ready to supply the foreign exchange and at 
the same time buy the bonds that foreign investors wish to unwind, and thus avoiding herding 
behavior and contagion of escalating capital reversals. Moreover, the dual intervention is a way 
to bring about the objective of monetary stability to be consistent with maintaining financial 
system stability. By stabilizing the foreign exchange market and government bond market, the 
dual intervention helps in stabilizing the overall financial markets.
The bold monetary policy adjustments pay off and gain credibility. Market confident 
quickly resumed and capital inflows were flourish since end of 2013 and throughout 2014. 
Macroeconomic and financial stability remain intact. In fact, inflation was down from 8.3% 
following subsidy reform in 2014 to 3.3% in 2015 and current account deficit quickly narrowed 
from 3.3% to 2.0% of GDP during the same period. This is the case of first quadrant, whereby 
risks of both price and financial stability is low. Nonetheless, economic growth slowed down 
from 5.2% in 2014 to 4.9% in 2015, and bank lending growth is tight at about 10%. With 
stability intact and the Fed policy communication becomes clear of gradual normalization process, 
the central bank cuts the policy rate three times a total of 75 bps during the first three months 
of 2016 to 6.75% at present. Reserve requirement was also lowered by 50 bps in November 
2015 and again by 100 bps to 6.5% in February 2016. We believe the monetary easing will 
reinforce fiscal stimulus to support economic growth with the inflation is forecasted to be within 
the target range of 4±1%. Together with accelerated structural reforms, Indonesia economic 
growth will be around 5.2-5.6% in 2016 and increase to 5.3-5.7% in 2017. 
Capital Flows Management
The CFM in Indonesia is to complement, not substitute, sound macroeconomic policy. We 
continue to believe that the best defense for mitigating the global spillovers is strong economic 
fundamentals, sound macroeconomic and financial system stability, and accelerated structural 
reforms. Specifically, the CFM Indonesia is guided with the following three principles. First, 
the objective is to mitigate the negative impacts of short-term volatility in capital flows to 
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instability of exchange rate as well as the overall monetary and financial system. Second, they 
are targeted, i.e. to short-term and speculative capital flows, as we welcome those inflows that 
are of medium-longer term that benefits the economy. Third, the measures are consistent with 
our broad principle of maintaining free foreign exchange system. As much as possible, we do 
not differentiate resident with non-residents. And they are temporary, i.e. the measures are 
strengthened when too much capital inflows and relaxed when too much capital outflows.
Followings provide clear examples. During the period of heavy capital inflows to the Fed 
tapper tantrum, we introduced in 2010 measures of CFM in the forms of six month holding 
period for transactions in the central bank bills and imposed a maximum of 30% capital to 
the short-term off-shore borrowings of the banks. But in the period following the Fed tapper 
tantrum in 2013 we relaxed the holding period to one month and expanded a number of 
transactions that are excluded from the calculation on off-shore borrowing of the banks. We 
view that these measures help in dampening the short-term and volatile capital flows, and thus 
are consistent with the objective of managing price and financial system stability. Significant 
progress in financial market deepening provides better facilitation to these capital flows and 
greater exchange rate flexibility. In the foreign exchange market, for instance, the introduction 
of JISDOR (Jakarta Interbank Spot Dollar Rate) as market reference for exchange rate has been a 
success and there has been significant increase in the transactions of hedging instruments (e.g. 
swaps and forwards) in the market. Repo market is also progressing in the money market.
We also introduced a new regulation at the end of 2014 for strengthening risk management 
of non-bank corporate external debts. In Indonesia, public debts are under controlled by the 
law limiting fiscal deficit of both central and sub-national government to maximum 3% of 
GDP. For banks, in addition to limit on short-term borrowing above, they are required to seek 
the central bank approvals to ensure their external borrowing consistent with the objective of 
macroeconomic and financial system stability. Under the new rule of 2014, non-bank corporate 
external debts are subjected to strengthened risk management in the forms of requiring them 
to have: (i) currency hedging ratio of minimum 25% of their net external debts due within three 
and six months, (ii) liquidity ratio (including the current foreign assets in the hedging ratio) of 
minimum 50% of their net external debts due within three and six months, and (iii) a minimum 
credit rating of one notch below the investment grade. The effectiveness is encouraging, as 
about 88% of more than 2000 companies that submit their quarterly financial reports in 2015 
to the central bank comply with the regulation. The new rule have also positive impacts to 
domestic foreign exchange market deepening as hedging instruments in the forms of swap 
and forward increase significantly. 
Macroprudential Policy
In addition to enlarging macroeconomic forecast and analysis to include macro-financial 
linkages for the formulation of macroprudential policy, we developed models to assess the 
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optimal lending growth of the banks (see Utari et.al, 2012). We apply the model to aggregate 
lending growth as well as lending growth to each bank, certain types of lending (consumption, 
working capital, and investment), and per economic sectors. By comparing these optimal vs. 
actual lending growth, we can determine where excessive lending occurs and assess their 
build-up systemic risks. Analyses of procyclicality of bank lending are useful in determining the 
timing of the counter-cyclical measures. And we assess what and when some instruments of 
macroprudential measures are justified and can be applied.
Following the empirical model explained above, we assess the macroprudential policy 
particularly the optimal lending growth of the banks to determine if the bank’s lending is 
excessive and build up systemic risk. This is the approach that we applied when introducing loan-
to-value (LTV) ratio to lending to automotive and property sectors averaging at about 70 percent 
in 2012 (Warjiyo, 2015a). As discussed above, while price stability remains under controlled, we 
faced build-up risks to financial stability as bank lending growth was rapid during this period. To 
strengthen the adjustment needed to ensure macroeconomic and financial stability following the 
Fed tapper tantrum, we then strengthen the LTV ratio to lending to property sectors in 2013, 
especially to mortgages for the second, third, and so on purchases of certain types of housing 
and apartments. The measures are also complemented by supervisory actions to banks that we 
viewed exhibit excessive lending behavior. We note that the formulation and implementation 
of macroprudential measures require a much detail and complex analysis and calibration, as 
well as the need for clear communication to the banks and business community. 
Our experience shows that the macroprudential measures and supervisory actions help in 
reinforcing the effectiveness of monetary transmission mechanism and supporting the financial 
system stability (Purnawan and Nasir, 2015; Wimanda et.al, 2012, 2014). Even though lending 
growths increased in the period prior the implementation of these measures, probably because 
banks and their customers wanted to utilize the interim period, they declined substantially in 
relatively short-period in the subsequent episode. The growth of mortgage on housing for less 
than 21 square meter, for instance, declined from more than 100% to the negative growth 
during the period of June to September 2012. Likewise, the growth of mortgage on apartment 
less than 21 square meter dropped from more than 300% to less than 10% during the period 
of January to November 2013. It should be noted that the automotive and property sectors 
contain substantially large import content, and thus managing lending growths to these two 
sectors help in reducing the current account deficit.
Subsequently, we relaxed our macroprudential measures by increasing the LTV ratio by 
an average of 10% in June 2015. As discussed above, our forecasted risks to both price and 
financial stability based on macroeconomic and macro-financial forecasts and policy analysis 
were low, a case of first quadrant. Nonetheless, the use of interest rate policy was constrained 
during that time due to uncertainty of the Fed fund rate increase. That is the reason why we 
started our easing policy stance with relaxation of macroprudential measures in June 2015, 
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and then followed by policy rate cuts started in January 2016. We believe our recent policy mix 
of policy rate cuts, lowering reserve requirement, and relaxing macroprudential, together with 
accelerated fiscal stimulus and structural reforms by the government, will reinforced each other 
to deliver better economic prospects of Indonesia with higher economic growth and sound 
macroeconomic and financial stability this year and beyond. 
As a part of its macroprudential policy, the central bank started to adopt a regulation 
on Countercyclical Capital Buffer (CCB) since end of 2015. Consistent with the easing stance 
of the central bank policy mix, the CCB is currently set at 0% and will be reviewed every six 
month. The central bank’s adoption of CCB is in accordance with the international standard 
on macroprudential policy. 
Institutional Setting
The effectiveness of central bank policy mix needs to be supported by strengthening institutional 
setting within the central bank and its close coordination with the government and related 
agencies. As we explained on methodology, we did enlarged the model to also include the 
external and banking sectors. Researches are conducted to better understand the behavior of 
capital flows and procyclicality of bank lending. More researches are underway to have more 
insights on the macro-financial linkages, procyclicality, and systemic risks. Better data and 
statistics are also important, including development of financial stability indicators and statistics 
on balance sheets interlinkages in the national as well as sub-national levels.
On the decision making process, there is debate to which better option to continue separate 
committees or to have joint committee for monetary policy and financial stability. Kohn (2015), 
for instance, prefers to have separate committee, considering differences in objective and focus, 
instruments, as well as for accountability. He cited the experience in the Bank of England setting 
up three committees outside monetary policy committee after the global crisis, i.e.: Prudential 
Regulation Authority (PRA) was set up under the Bank to conduct microprudential, Financial 
Conduct Authority (FCA) to oversees the financial markets, and Financial Policy Committee 
(FPC) for macroprudential policy. In Indonesia, we do not have the problem since the board of 
central bank is one board that oversees all of monetary, macroprudential, and payment system 
policies. The central bank do have separate committees chaired by deputy governor of each 
monetary, macroprudential, and payment system policies. To support the central bank policy 
mix, a joint policy committee is set up before the board meeting to integrate the analysis of 
macroeconomy and financial stability, as well as to coordinate recommendation on the policy 
mix. We find the joint policy committee enrich our understanding of the interlinkages between 
macroeconomy and financial system, and what policy mix that better suits for achieving price 
stability and supporting financial stability. 
The central bank is also in close coordination with the government and other related 
agencies. Coordination of monetary and fiscal policy is closely conducted between central bank 
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and ministry of finance in the budget formulation as well as other aspects of macroeconomic 
management. Even though the central bank is independence, its policy mix constitutes an integral 
part of macroeconomic policy mix of monetary, fiscal, and structural reform at the national level 
(Warjiyo, 2013a). On financial system stability, coordination is done through Financial Stability 
Policy Coordination Committee (FSPCC) chaired by Ministry of Finance with members of Bank 
Indonesia, Financial Service Authority (IFSA), and Deposit Insurance Institution (IDIC). A new 
law on prevention and resolution of financial system stability was just passed which provides 
strong legal foundation of roles and responsibility of each institution on financial stability, 
dealing with systemically important banks, and crisis prevention and resolution mechanism. The 
central bank’s macroprudential policy is also closely coordinated with the FSA’s microprudential 
regulation and supervision. 
IV. CONCLUSION
We already present the key concepts and implementation of central bank policy mix in 
meeting the renewed mandate for achieving price stability and supporting financial system 
stability. It comprises four key elements of policies on interest rate, exchange rate, capital 
flows management, and macroprudential. The renewed mandates of central bank on price 
and financial stability are complimentary. We present four different cases of price and financial 
stability that warrant different policy mix. Monetary policy with inflation targeting framework 
serves as a foundation for the policy mix. The key is to enlarge the standard macroecnomic 
policy forecasting and analysis to incorporate macro-financial linkages to assess procyclicality 
of the financial system and build-up systemic risks, and the corresponding policy mix that is 
consistent with the emerging problems.
Our experience with the central bank policy mix in Indonesia since 2010 shows that it is 
superior than the standard inflation targeting framework. We present three episodes with the 
policy mix that play important role for Indonesia resilience in withstanding the global spillovers. 
To support the policy mix, we enlarge our policy forecasting and analysis model to encompass 
macro-financial linkages, especially external and banking sectors. A number of researches are 
developed to better understand the macro-financial linkages, focusing on the procyclicality and 
systemic risks from capital flows, private external debts, housing bubbles, and bank lending. 
Internal decision making process has also been strengthened by introducing joint monetary and 
financial system stability committee within the central bank to formulate the policy mix. 
Closer coordination with the government and related agencies has been strengthened. 
At the national level, the central bank’s policy mix constitutes an integral part of economic 
policy mix of macroeconomic policy, financial system stability policy, and structural reforms. 
Accelerated structural reforms aim at achieving higher output potential for economic growth. 
Coordination on fiscal and monetary policy is geared toward managing economic cycles 
for maintaining both macroeconomic internal balance (low inflation) and external balance 
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(sustainable current account). At the same time, policy coordination on financial system stability, 
including macroprudential policy of the central bank, aims at managing financial cycles and 
mitigating systemic risks for promoting macro-financial balances. These measures of national 
economic policy mix is very important for achieving sustainable economic growth with sound 
macroeconomic and financial stability.
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